I would know, too.
Some banks held the subprime paper, but most of it was held outside the commercial banking space. Pension funds, insurance companies and the like took baths, but a good number of banks also held the securitized "PLUMBS" (Private Label Mortgage Backed Securities). What killed most of the 518 or so banks during this downturn was the sudden stop in building, not the mortgage paper itself. They were overextended in development loans, building the infrastructure of residential subdivisions and constructing commerical developments ("ADC" loans - acquisition, development and construction) loans. If something didn't have a building on it yet - just the dirt - we saw 80 percent depreciation in some markets.
As much as I'd like to simply blame Clinton for this, I'd put more of it at the feet of Congress in their lax supervision of, and push to expand, the quasi-gov't mortgage companies, mostly Fannie. Barnie Frnk's protection of his "friend's" pockebook was criminal. That, and the simple lack of accountability when paper was sold. Whenever the incentive to make a loan is separated from the risk of not fully collecting it, capitalism can, and did, run amok. There should always be a credit quality hook on securitizations and incentive compensation.
RTR,
Tim